

# Venture

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## MIRACLE IN CYPRUS

By LENA JEGER, M.P.

THE most effective epitaph on the Government's policy in Cyprus was written years ago, unintentionally, by Duff Cooper in his autobiography, 'Old Men Forget': 'It would be interesting to collect historical instances of harm that has been done by the reluctance of men to accept readily what they know they will have to accept in the end.' In fact in the end, H.M. Government has had to accept much less in Cyprus than was possible at earlier stages in the argument. During the talks previous to his deportation in 1956, Archbishop Makarios had been prepared to accept continuing British sovereignty over the whole island, with Britain maintaining control over defence and foreign policy. The arguments then were about internal security, the composition of the Chamber that was to deal with the non-reserved powers, and the possibility of an amnesty. The Archbishop, at that point, was bundled out of the island because, it was said, of his connection with terrorism. During his exile violence greatly increased and the death roll of Britons, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots grew tragically longer. Nearly 30,000 troops and police failed to defeat Eoka, or to catch its leader, Grivas. But many people had to be hunted, hurt, imprisoned and impoverished before the British Government accepted a solution in which they made far more serious concessions than had previously been sought.

The main mistake of the British Government was to bring their nineteenth century gun-boat mentality to bear on this twentieth century problem. Because Britain had strategic needs in Cyprus, the Cypriot people were supposed to accept unchallenged foreign occupation of their country.

Because public opinion was becoming more sensitive on the rightness of conduct which seemed not wholly compatible with membership of the United Nations, some other justification had to be created to help the Government. Was it against the will of the people for Britain to stay? Perhaps we could find some people who wanted us to stay? The Turkish minority was the answer. The 18 per cent. of Cypriots who are Turkish, descendants of the original invaders of the island, were encouraged to discover suddenly that they could not go on living

in amity with the Greek Cypriots. The suggestion of partition, mentioned in the House of Commons by the late Walter Elliot and repeated by Lennox-Boyd in 1956, was seized on, as a dog seizes a bone.

This distrust between the two communities, synthetic at first, became dangerously near to reality. That it was largely synthetic is clear from the way in which confidence is now being re-established.

### Greek-Turkish Rapprochement

After the disastrous failure of the Tripartite Conference of 1954, the greater miracle seems to be the agreement of Greece and Turkey. For years the British Government has opposed United Nations discussions on Cyprus on the grounds that Cyprus was a domestic, colonial issue. So the sore spread.

What then, has brought Greece and Turkey closer, at least on this issue? One hopes it is a genuine realisation of their common interests as neighbours in the Middle East, as Members of UN and of NATO. The cynics say that the explanation is rather to be found in behind-the-scenes American pressure. The United States is contributing heavily to the economy in Greece and in Turkey; their quarrel over Cyprus exposed the Eastern flank of NATO in a way which could have invalidated the heavy American commitments.

The use made of Cyprus as a base for the discreditable Suez adventure undermined British claims to use the island for any high-minded purpose. The main lesson of Suez was for Britain that the day of isolated adventures is over, and that, if the Western Alliance is to have any reality, there must be a co-ordinated foreign policy. But with half our NATO land commitment locked up in Cyprus we were open to criticisms on several counts.

But all this would have taken longer to have any effect in Cyprus had it not been for the willingness of Makarios to renounce Enosis. This was a courageous decision, of which the Archbishop had given some hints before his important interview with Barbara Castle. This was the catalyst in the situation.

Again the British Government bungled. Instead of taking up this golden opportunity for a new initiative



by approaching Turkey on the partition issue, they let the situation drift, while 50 more lives were lost.

What in fact has the agreement produced? Firstly, the end of fighting, the amnesty, the surrender of arms, and the return of Makarios to his people. This is the end of the beginning, and sufficient reason for welcoming the agreement.

This 'independent' republic—about the size of two English counties—is to have installed troops from Greece, from Turkey, and from Britain—the last in independent enclaves. There can be no existing 'independent' country in the world forced to accept such limitations on its sovereignty. There is also to be a Cypriot army of 2,000 (60 per cent. Greek and 40 per cent. Turkish).

The constitution has still to be worked out, but it is laid down that the President is to be Greek, and the Vice-President Turkish. As the latter is to have the power of veto, there will be in fact two co-presidents, with the representative of the minority able to frustrate the majority. One has to hope that the veto will not in practice be used in this way.

### Need for Mutual Confidence

The House of Representatives, to be elected by universal suffrage, will have 70 per cent. Greek members and 30 per cent. Turkish. The population proportions are about 18 per cent. Turkish and 80 per cent. Greek. The Council of Ministers, chosen by the President and Vice-President respectively, will consist of four Greeks and three Turks. It is to be hoped that, in dealing with the common problems of the island, the representatives may gradually come to some joint Cypriot consciousness. Similarly the Civil Service is to consist of 70 per cent. Greeks and 30 per cent. Turks, although one would hope in time that confidence would be strong enough for professional people to be judged on their merits.

The Communal Chambers are to provide for the religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions, and questions of personal status. To a certain extent this already happens under the Ethnarchy Council and the Evkaf.

It would be a pity if education were indefinitely regarded as a communal matter, especially higher education. There is too little of this in the island, and one must hope that institutes like the Forestry School, for instance, will be gladly shared.

The establishment of separate municipalities in the five largest towns seems retrograde, but at least is less offensive than when proposed under the Foot plan, when it seemed the precursor of partition.

The documents published in the two White Papers are described as 'the agreed foundation for the final settlement.' It remains to be seen what scope that gives for amendment of the published proposals. Many questions still arise. For instance, all activity to promote 'directly or indirectly either union or partition' is prohibited. In the event of a breach of this, or other conditions, 'each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.'

Given good will and commonsense even this might work without abuse. But in an atmosphere of doubt

and mistrust, such phrases might well be invoked for any schoolboy demonstration.

Here is muted sovereignty indeed. But it is not for outside critics to sabotage the difficult task of all concerned. The representatives of the Cypriot people, Greek and Turkish, left and right, believers and unbelievers, Christians, communists and Moslems, have agreed to support the plan as set out. For the first time the Cypriot people are to elect a parliament of their own, and to take democratic responsibilities, however circumscribed. They need help and encouragement and understanding from their friends, as they suffer their inevitable growing pains. Some may hope that one overdue political development will be the emergence of a strong Labour party, cutting across racial barriers and cancelling anachronistic divisions.

Above all, it is to be hoped that Cyprus will stay in the Commonwealth. The bitterness of the last few years has almost wrecked the possibility, but other considerations are important. Economically Cyprus needs to be in the sterling area. Her imports are double her exports. She is in fact an underdeveloped territory and needs all the help possible from the Colonial Development Corporation and other sources. But, in Lord Attlee's words, when as Prime Minister he was speaking of Burma: 'We invite, but we do not compel, people to stay in the Commonwealth.' The tragedy of Cyprus is that this policy was not applied before. But we may be just in time, given the new spirit of looking forward for which her leaders have asked, to have this belated invitation accepted by the Cypriot people, to their advantage and ours.

### CENTRAL AFRICAN CRISIS

IN a letter to *The Times* on 25th November, 1957, we wrote: 'the Africans of the two Northern Protectorates have used every constitutional means open to them to express their deep-seated opposition [to Federation] . . . on what means can they now rely?'

Nyasaland, which has not had any constitutional advance, has given the answer. The Bureau is deeply concerned that a number of its members including Orton Chirwa, the only African barrister, are in Southern Rhodesian jails and that so many African lives have been lost.

In May, when we have the complete results of the Northern Rhodesian elections and further information on developments in Central Africa, we shall devote a considerable part of VENTURE to political comment on the Central African situation and to an examination of the economic consequences of federation.

A meeting of protest against Government action in Central Africa was held on Monday, 9th March, by the Africa Bureau, with the full support of the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau.



### **CAMEROONS FUTURE**

**T**HE Southern Cameroons has so far seemed willing to settle its disputes democratically and Dr. Endeley is the first African ever to be demoted from Premier to Leader of the Opposition. Nevertheless, the country is tense and likely to become more so as its neighbours, Nigeria and the French Cameroons move to independence.

There are two possibilities: the country can become independent in October, 1960, as a self-governing region within the Nigerian Federation, or it can secede from the Federation and negotiate to join the French Cameroons, due for independence next January. These are the only alternatives—with a population of 750,000 an area of under 17,000 square miles and few natural resources, the country is not viable.

All the Cameroons are Trusteeship Territories and final responsibility lies with the United Nations. For the last forty years, however, the Northern and Southern Cameroons have been administered by Britain as part of Nigeria. The people of the Northern Cameroons in November will decide by plebiscite whether they wish to remain part of an independent Nigeria or to postpone the decision. It is almost certain that they will decide to remain with Nigeria, but the wishes of the Southerners are less clear.

In the last few years the government in power—an alliance of the Kamerun National Congress and the Kamerun People's Party under the leadership of Dr. Endeley—has maintained the ties with Nigeria on the grounds that only with Nigeria can the Cameroons find economic and political stability.

But Dr. Endeley, his party and his policy have become less and less popular and in 1957 he was only able to form a government by alliance. The prestige of the Kamerun National Democratic Party, which favours unification with the French Cameroons has been growing and last January, after a close fought election, the K.N.D.P. came to power and Mr. Foncha replaced Dr. Endeley.

The matter is more complicated than it seems at first sight, since tribal affiliations and personal rivalries influenced the electorate quite as much as the policy statements of the two parties. The question of unification with the French Cameroons was kept in the background and it is unlikely that all the voters realised that by voting for secession from Nigeria, they were also voting for unification with the French territory. In spite of safeguards in the Constitution, many Cameroonians feel that after independence they will be swamped by 35m. Nigerians, and it was this feeling which brought the K.N.D.P. to power.

The practical advantages of remaining with Nigeria are obvious. The last constitutional conference defined the position of the Southern Cameroons exactly and the status of the country is clear. Federal control of the essential services would carry on unbroken and membership of the Commonwealth and of the sterling area is assured.

On the other hand a considerable mystique has been built up in both the French and the British territories about 'One Kamerun', and though no negotiations have taken place with the French leaders there is unlikely to be any difficulty from their side.

There remains one imponderable: the French Cameroons is only gradually recovering from the terrorist activities of the Union des Populations du Cameroun. This party which was outlawed by the French in 1955, now has its headquarters in Cairo, and its leader Felix Moumie was one of the most intransigent delegates to the Accra Conference. It is not impossible that an independent French and British Cameroons might be controlled by the U.P.C.—and this is Moumie's declared object.

Such considerations do not carry much weight with the K.N.D.P. leaders, and it is likely that nationalist feeling will grow in the next few months. The need for a plebiscite is obvious. The election was too close and the issues too muddled for it to be acceptable as proof of the feelings of the people. The United Nations has agreed to supervise a plebiscite early next year, but reached no agreement as to what question should be asked. Foncha argues that since secession is the immediate issue the question should be secession or continued Trusteeship. But the people must not be misled. Trusteeship cannot continue for ever and once the ties with Nigeria are broken, they will be hard to remake. The country has to choose between Nigeria and the French Cameroons and this should be the question. Sir Andrew Cohen has been pressing for a plebiscite in the United Nations. In West Africa at least we have realised the dangers of federating a country without consulting the people.

### **NORTHERN NIGERIA**

**O**VER the last five years in Northern Nigeria a hasty attempt has been made to mould a feudal, Islamic system into a Western democracy. Some progress has been made. The Emir is now the Emir-in-Council; proposals are before the Assembly which will simplify the judicial system; at the next election, all men over the age of 21 will have the vote. The government (for the last year entirely African except for the Attorney-General) has recognised—if reluctantly—the need for women's education and is making an effort to



conciliate the non-Muslim areas within the north by speeding up development and by giving non-Muslims greater prominence in the Government.

There is still a long way to go. The opposition party, the Northern Elements Progressive Union, persistently complains of intimidation, of summary justice and of discrimination against its supporters. The District Heads, who are nominated by the Emirs to administer the rural areas, have absolute power and there is little check on the way they use it. Recently the Ilorin Native Authority, which favoured the Action Group and was the only one elected by secret ballot, was suspended by the Government. The reason given was that it was corrupt. It probably was—but no more so than the other native authorities.

Politically the Northern Peoples' Congress is almost without rival. It controls 109 of the 134 seats in the Northern Assembly and is the largest single party in the Federal House. It has little overall organisation but depends for its strength on the allegiance of the Emirs and of the administrators appointed by the Emirs. N.E.P.U. is weak because it is supported by those who are socially unacceptable.

On March 15th, the Northern region became self-governing and on October 1st, 1960, Nigeria will be independent. When the Northern Government has complete power will it abandon all show of democracy and return to autocratic rule? There are those who think that it will. On the other

hand though new reforms may not be put through quickly enough to suit everyone there are many reasons why at least the present state should be maintained.

A country with only 500 children sitting school certificate, and with 150 doctors to 18 million people, is in desperate need of teachers, doctors, technicians and investment from outside—and the West does not give aid so easily to dictators. Again the Northern leaders, if they are to keep their predominance in the Federal House, must conciliate both the dissidents within the North and the democratically governed Eastern and Western regions.

But it is the possibility of an opposition within the Northern region which will effectively check the N.P.C. Differences between the Premier of the North, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and the Prime Minister of the Federation, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa are no secret. Both are leading members of the N.P.C., but Balewa is considerably more progressive and is known to favour the democratic reorganisation of the Native Authorities and votes for women. If the Sardauna were to give his support to a more autocratic regime, Balewa might well break away from the N.P.C. and take the progressive wing with him.

All these issues will be in the Sardauna's mind as he prepares for the immense Salla which, at the end of Ramadan, will celebrate self-government for the North.

## Nyasaland and Federation

By EIRENE WHITE, M.P.

IT is a simple political axiom that if people are denied adequate political outlets they will take matters into their own hands. This has happened in Nyasaland, where active resistance, on civil disobedience lines, has taken place. The White Paper giving details of certain incidents also reasserts allegations concerning the 'murder plot', but adds no concrete evidence to the hearsay account already put forward by Mr. Lennox-Boyd. The facts are that so far no European or Asian has been killed and the 50 Africans who have died have all been killed by the security forces. Wild words may have been spoken, but there is something inherently improbable in a plot sanctioned by the higher command of the African National Congress to include the murder of the Governor and also of missionaries in general. There are various other reasons for disbelieving this particular item in the indictment which one hopes will be fully probed by the commission set up under Mr. Justice Devlin, 'to inquire into the recent disturbances in Nyasaland and the events leading up to them'.

It has been emphasised that this is a commission presided over by a judge, but not a judicial commis-

sion. Its findings, however, will carry little weight unless it is given the fullest access to persons in detention, and to documents, secret or otherwise. Its terms of reference are wide enough for it to give an appraisal of opinions as well as events. But it is not required to make any recommendations on policy.

This would have been the function of the Parliamentary commission proposed by the Labour Party. Instead, a further body is to be set up, possibly on the lines of the 1930 Simon Commission in India, to prepare the way for constitutional talks for the Federation as a whole in 1960. It is likely to have constitutional experts combined with a few political nominees. It cannot carry African confidence unless it is allowed full freedom to discuss all possible methods of dealing with the Federation, including its possible dissolution or the secession of any one territory. Such a body would not, of course, reach any decisions. But the minds of African political leaders would be closed to its recommendations if it were kept to the basis for discussion set forward by Mr. Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary in 1953. He then stated in the House of Commons that such funda-



mental changes would be outside the scope of the 1960 constitutional review, which would be confined to the distribution of powers between the federal and territorial governments, representation in the Federal Parliament and the like. Constitutional lawyers may argue that legally the Federation is indissoluble except with the consent of all the governments concerned. But if this is held to preclude putting the subject on the agenda, Nyasaland Africans in particular are bound to regard it as evidence of a European conspiracy and possibly as a further incitement to direct action.

### Constitutional Reform Overdue

In the meantime, several other urgent matters need attention. One reason for the trouble in Nyasaland has been the endless delay over constitutional reform. In March, 1958, the Labour Party Executive called for 'a majority of elected Africans in the Nyasaland Legislative Council and the appointment of African Ministers equal in number to those of other races'. Last summer it appeared as though proposals would soon be published. Months passed and still no announcement has been made of the government's intentions. The present position, with only five indirectly elected Africans in Legislative Council and none in Executive Council, is indefensible. With 1960 approaching it is essential that Africans should predominate in Nyasaland representation, although it is now too late to give them the background of experience in Legislative Council and in government which would have been desirable.

Secondly, the position of African leaders in Nyasaland must be clarified. Either charges should be preferred against them and they should be brought to court or they should be released. If they are kept in indefinite detention one cannot see how there can be any hope of African acceptance of any constitutional proposals. A sullen stalemate leading almost certainly to further violence could be expected.

If, on the other hand, generous proposals are made and the leaders are released from detention, there is at least a fair chance of co-operation and orderly progress in Nyasaland itself.

Unfortunately, events in Southern Rhodesia have confirmed all too sharply African fears of the Federation. The speeches of Sir Roy Welensky and that of Lord Malvern in the House of Lords, which was one of the more wickedly irresponsible of his many irresponsible utterances, can only have had the effect of hardening resistance to any government dominated by such people. Events in Northern Rhodesia have been a little more hopeful, showing that, even with a complex and limited franchise, Africans were able to assist in frustrating Sir Roy's ambition to secure an over-all majority for the United Federal Party. Had more of them registered as electors, they might perhaps have changed another seat or two. But they could have done nothing to secure anything like adequate representation for the African majority or even for the liberal Central African Party.

In this situation, the United Kingdom government must urgently seek to recover the initiative which throughout this emergency it has so lamentably lost.

It has given the impression, whether justified or not, of almost accepting in advance a condition of Dominion status for the Federation. The affair of John Stonehouse was for this reason profoundly disturbing and must have shaken the confidence of many Africans in the ability of H.M. Government to protect 'British protected persons' when they appeared powerless to protect a British M.P. against whom no charge has been made. For this reason, too, the introduction of Southern Rhodesian troops into Nyasaland, with its obvious political connotation was to be deplored. Any extra forces needed should have been under United Kingdom control.

European politicians in the Federation have thrown away their opportunities of conciliating African opinion in the relatively easy first six years of 'partnership'. The British Parliament, as the protecting power, must now take a lead if further bitterness and, possibly, violence are to be avoided.

### Correspondence

To the Editor of VENTURE

#### TANGANYIKA AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Sir,—Miss Joan Wicken and Mr. Amir Jamal in your issues of September and November, 1958, respectively, have accused A.N.C. of racialism and Mr. Jamal has further said that we are receiving support from forces outside Tanganyika.

When Mr. Julius Nyerere's T.A.N.U. dropped African nationalism and adopted a nationalism embracing all races, members of our party, the A.N.C., felt that we could no longer work with him. We do not hate non-Africans or wish to drive them away, but we feel that the African's right to govern a country in which they are 98 per cent. of the population must be asserted first. When Tanganyika has become a self-governing state with an entirely African government, the citizenship of non-Africans can be affirmed on terms of absolute equality. If non-African rights are established as part of the policy and achievement of colonialism we shall for ever be left with the feeling that they were imposed on us while we were too weak politically to resist.

We do not know what made Mr. Jamal say that we receive support from forces outside Tanganyika, because that is not true at all. Mr. Jamal is welcome to call at our office at any time for detailed inspection of both our financial and other records. No quarter in the United Kingdom gave Zuberi Mtemvu, our Founder-President, financial support. Mtemvu reported to the A.N.C. Executive Committee, that all he got while in the United Kingdom was the readiness of both British M.P.s and socialist organisations to listen to what he has to tell them.

J. D. LIFA CHIPAKA,

Tanganyika.

General Secretary, A.N.C.



# Organisations for the Promotion of Development in Africa

By DAVID BLELLOCH

THE first part of this article outlined, under the heading of multilateral aid, the aims and activities of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies. Under the same heading come Regional Inter-Governmental Bodies.

## **The Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara (CCTA)**

CCTA was established in 1950, and is now composed of the following governments: Belgium, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, France, Ghana, Liberia, Portugal, Union of South Africa, and United Kingdom. It 'has practically no administrative structure. It has no entity of its own. It is a means to promote co-operation.'

'Among the Commission's many activities two of the most important are, first, the arranging of exchange of experience and information between experts working in the same field in the various territories; this exchange takes place in conferences or meetings, or by direct contact inside panels of correspondents; and, secondly, the supervision of a number of inter-African bureaux and committees dealing with such a range of activities as labour, trypanosomiasis, epizootic diseases, geology, soils and rural economy, housing, statistics, social sciences, rural welfare, and maps and surveys. And in other scientific and technical fields CCTA has organised joint activities in which several countries co-operate, for example, joint research into productivity; a joint survey on migrations; the preparation of specialised atlases for Africa and of bibliographies; and the establishment of joint training centres for technical staff. In addition, CCTA publishes reports of its meetings and other works of scientific value. It performs its functions, in the main, through a number of subsidiary organisations, some of which are described below.

## **(a) The Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa South of the Sahara (FAMA)**

FAMA was launched in February, 1958, after careful consideration had been given to the possibility and desirability of setting up some sort of a 'Colombo Plan' for Africa. The member Governments of CCTA did not consider that the time had come to co-ordinate investment policies and economic plans, but they did agree that FAMA was needed in order to perform the Colombo Plan's technical assistance functions. FAMA's Constitution contemplates three forms of technical assistance: the services of experts, instructors or advisers; the training of personnel; and the supply of equipment for training purposes. A start has been made towards the organisation of mutual assistance under all these three heads; and negotiations aiming at mutual co-operation have taken place both with the United Nations Specialised Agencies and with the International Co-operation Administration of the United States. FAMA does not normally finance the supply of technical assistance, though 'a Central Fund may be established

to be used in exceptional cases to facilitate the realisation of specific programmes of technical assistance arranged bilaterally.' The right to use FAMA's services is not reserved exclusively to member countries.

## **(b) The Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara (CSA)**

This Council consists of eminent scientists, chosen in an individual capacity from the whole range of scientific disciplines on account of their personal pre-eminence. 'They are all Africans, by adoption if not by birth, for their work, their experience, their life itself have been in the service of Africa for many years.' It advises CCTA on all scientific questions.

## **(c) The Inter-African Research Fund**

CCTA also administers this fund whose object is to promote joint scientific research and technical projects, in the following categories: broad surveys, including information and liaison work; research on problems which involve uniform study by small highly specialised staffs operating over wide areas; and research on problems which affect many countries but which should be investigated initially in one limited area

## **(d) The Inter-African Labour Institute**

Among the many technical bureaux and committees operating under CCTA's supervision, this Institute (established in 1952) deserves special mention. It holds regular meetings, and has published *inter alia*, a 'preliminary survey' of *The Human Factors of Productivity in Africa* which deserves careful study by all those concerned with problems of industrialisation in under-developed countries everywhere.

Under the heading of bi-lateral aid (non-metropolitan):

## **(1) The U.S.A.**

Development assistance to African countries and territories has been supplied by the United States mainly through two agencies: the International Co-operation Administration (and its predecessors), and the Export Import Bank. A third agency, the Development Loan Fund, has now come into the picture and may be expected to play an increasingly important part. The scale of U.S. aid is indicated by Table I. (To the total figure of \$737.9m. shown in this table should be added a further \$61.5m. for fiscal year 1957.) Until 1954 most U.S. assistance was given in the form of relatively large loans and grants for the development of transportation and power facilities. Between 1954 and 1957 it was on a much smaller scale and, except in Libya, was mainly limited to technical assistance. The figure for fiscal year 1957 (see above) represents a sharp rise, which is attributed to the emergence of new states in Africa. (Apart from governmental assistance, and among the many items of aid supplied by private bodies in the United States, special mention may be made of the *Rockefeller Brothers' Fund*, which has recently made



plans to spend a quarter of a million dollars a year to support investigations aimed at seeking out investment opportunities in Nigeria, Ghana and Liberia, and to help prepare likely projects for submission to potential lenders and investors.)

#### (a) The International Co-operation Administration (ICA)

Through ICA the U.S. Government now supplies development aid under two heads: 'technical co-operation,' i.e. technical assistance together with such equipment and supplies as may be 'required to demonstrate new techniques or to assist in the build-up of local institutions which are needed for continuing application of newly acquired know-how'; and 'special assistance' which is 'designed to cover economic aid necessary to achieve any of the variety of political, economic or other objectives which the United States may have in a given country. It is used where the support of significant military forces is not an important objective of U.S. policy and where the assistance cannot be provided under technical co-operation or the Development Loan Fund'. For fiscal year 1959 the Administration has asked Congress to vote \$140m. for bilateral technical co-operation (\$14,450,000 of which is allocated to Africa) and \$212m. for special assistance (\$83m. allocated to Africa). In addition it has asked for a separate 'contingency fund' of \$200m. designed

financed under other U.S. Government programmes as well as other external public and private financing. It is expected that technical co-operation programmes in Africa will also be particularly useful in providing economic and engineering surveys, or technical advice and consultation in specific planning and preparatory activities necessary to the sound development and implementation of projects for which Development Loan Fund financing may be requested.' Special assistance 'is requested in order to provide the economic support necessary to the maintenance of political and economic stability in Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Somalia and Tunisia.'

#### (b) The Export-Import Bank ('Eximbank')

Eximbank is a U.S. Government corporation, set up in 1934 for the purpose of encouraging U.S. export trade. Its authorised capital is now \$7,000m. It grants development loans to foreign governments or firms to finance the purchase of U.S. goods and services, and export credits to U.S. exporters for particular transactions so that they may in turn grant credit to the foreign exporter. The Bank's operations in Africa have hitherto been mainly concerned with the export of mining equipment to companies in South Africa (particularly for the production of uranium waste from the gold mines). Smaller loans have also been made to Liberia, Ethiopia and Portuguese Africa.<sup>1</sup>

### CUMULATIVE SUMMARY OF POST-WAR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO AFRICA (Up to March, 1956, unless otherwise stated; in thousands of dollars.)

	Loans for production of strategic and basic materials <sup>1</sup>	Special reserve fund for overseas development	European fund	Technical Co-operation	Development Assistance	Export Import Bank	TOTALS
Belgian Congo	1,550.0	17,073.0	—	133.9	—	—	18,756.9
British Africa	51,602.0	8,637.0	—	1,638.0	4,964.0 <sup>2</sup>	—	66,841.0
French Africa	32,347.0	29,472.0	297,670.6	1,210.2	4,933.3 <sup>2</sup>	—	365,633.1
Somalia	—	—	—	736.2	300.0	—	1,036.2
Portuguese Africa	4,630.0	—	—	161.0	—	17,000.0	21,791.0
Ethiopia & Eritrea	—	—	—	12,351.0	—	3,000.0	15,351.0
Liberia	—	—	—	7,647.0	—	21,350.0	28,997.0
Libya	—	—	—	8,075.0	5,000.0	—	8,075.0
Egypt <sup>3</sup>	—	—	—	21,667.0	40,000.0	—	61,667.0
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Union of South Africa	—	—	—	—	—	149,685.0	149,685.0
Total	90,269.0	55,182.0	297,670.6	53,619.3	55,197.3	191,035.0	737,973.2

<sup>1</sup> April, 1948, to 31st December, 1955.

<sup>2</sup> Local currencies made available through surplus agricultural commodity sales.

<sup>3</sup> Figures at 30th June, 1956.

to meet 'situations which are either unforeseen or contingent'.

So far as Africa is concerned 'particular emphasis under the technical co-operation programme is placed on agricultural, health and education projects where immediate progress is likely to demonstrate the benefits of increased economic development to a large segment of the population... Technical co-operation programmes are related where possible to the major economic development programmes of the host government and to development projects

#### (c) The Development Loan Fund (DLF)

The Fund was established in 1957, and in 1958 was incorporated as an independent government corporation. Congress has so far appropriated \$700m. for its operations. Its operations are intended to be highly flexible: it may finance loans, credits, guarantees or other operations and transactions; its arrange-

<sup>1</sup> The United Africa Co. Ltd., *Statistical and Economic Review*, No. 20, September, 1957; *The United States and Africa*, The American Assembly, Columbia University, New York, June, 1958.



ments may be made with persons, private corporations, nations, organisations or other entities (though private enterprise is specifically preferred); and loan terms and conditions are to be handled on a negotiated, case-by-case, basis. To be eligible for financing, an activity must be localised in 'one of the less developed friendly countries' and there must be a reasonable prospect that the loan will be repaid. Criteria to be considered are: the contribution of the proposed activity to the economic growth of the country in which it is located; the economic and technical soundness of the activity; the availability of financing on reasonable terms from 'other free world sources'; and the possible adverse effect of the project upon the U.S. economy. Government guarantee of repayment is not necessarily required. Repayment of dollar loans in local currency may be permitted. The Fund made its first loan in May, 1958, by the end of that year had virtually exhausted its \$700m. and faced additional applications for loans totalling well over \$1,000m. (As preference is to be given to 'projects in the less developed areas which have a great need for capital' and to 'those areas which are least able to obtain development financing on reasonable terms from other free-world sources' it is reasonable to expect that the Fund will pay particular attention to applications from Africa.)

## (2) The U.S.S.R.

No details can be given, but the signature in December, 1958, of formal agreements under which the Soviet Government is to help Egypt finance the construction of one section of the Aswan High Dam suggests that Soviet aid for African development is likely to become increasingly important.

## (3) Western Germany

One result of the increasingly close relationship between France and Western Germany is likely to be a growing participation of the latter country in financing the development of the former's African dependencies. 'The French Government was instrumental in getting special provision for her overseas territories in the European Economic Community, which began formally on 1st January, 1958. Under these arrangements the French succeeded in getting net contributions of \$311m. from the other members of the Community, notably Western Germany, to a Development Fund to be invested in the French overseas territories over the five years 1958-63.'

Under the heading of bilateral aid (metropolitan):

### (1) The United Kingdom

#### (a) Colonial Development and Welfare Funds (CDW)

The British metropolitan Government first gave aid specifically for colonial development under the Colonial Development Act of 1929, which provided £1m. a year for schemes 'to aid and develop agriculture and industry in the colonial territories, and thereby to promote commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom.' This Act was superseded in 1940 by the first of a series of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, which provided £5m. a year for

schemes 'likely to promote the development of the resources of any colony or the welfare of its people,' plus £500,000 a year for research. Under the latest Act (1955) £119m. has been made available for the five-year period 1955-60. The maximum amount that may be expended in any one year is £30m., including £3m. for research.

Aid under the CDW Acts has mostly taken the form of grants rather than loans. The essential purpose has been to provide the (usually non-profit earning) economic and social infrastructure for development. Nearly half of the funds granted to all territories have been devoted to the social services, particularly education; about one-fifth to communications; and the balance to miscellaneous objects in such fields as administration, physical planning and training schemes.

Total issues from the CDW funds during the twelve years ended 31st March, 1958, amounted to £155,418,000. The amounts specifically allotted to African territories are shown in table below.

#### (b) The Colonial Development Corporation (CDC)

The CDC was set up under the Overseas Resources Development Act, 1948, to undertake, on its own account or in partnership with private enterprise or colonial governments, development schemes which over a period of years could reasonably be expected to pay their way but which would not be attractive to private capital working alone. The Corporation operates on commercial lines, and is under a statutory obligation to pay its way, taking one year with another. (Considering the experimental character of the scheme when it was first launched, it is not surprising that its accounts for the first seven years showed an annual deficit, over £8m. having been lost on projects which were launched in the first few years and were subsequently abandoned. From 1955 onwards its operations have yielded an annual surplus. The Corporation has—unsuccessfully so far—been urging the Government to cancel its outstanding debt on account of the early losses. In its report and accounts for 1957 it declares roundly that 'financing of overseas risk-bearing projects solely by repayable loan capital is woefully unsound; most CDC financial problems which hamper current, and will increasingly hamper future, operations derive from this feature of its capital structure; it is in effect and in fact a financial nonsense.') It has power to borrow up to £150m. outstanding at any one time plus £10m. on short term. Of the £150m. up to £130m. may be borrowed from the Government, interest payments being post-

### C.D.W. ALLOCATIONS TO 31st MARCH, 1958

(£000s to nearest £1,000)  
Development and Welfare

Territory	Grants	Loans	Research	
			Grants	Total's
Africa—Gen. ...	368	—	180	548
E. and C. Africa—				
General ...	1,500	—	600	2,100
East Africa ...	34,819	200	6,330	41,349
Central Africa ...	9,572	138	856	52,256
West Africa ...	49,307	31	2,918	10,566
South Africa				
H.C.T. ...	6,548	68	138	6,749
Totals, all African				
Territories ...	102,114	437	11,017	113,568

<sup>2</sup> *The United States and Africa, op. cit.*, p. 137.



poned for the first seven years: the loans and interest are repayable by 33 annuities starting at the eighth year. The CDC has no direct planning functions.

Of 77 projects now in hand, 47 are being carried out in African territories.

**(c) The Commonwealth Development Finance Company Limited (CDFC)**

This private company was set up in 1953 as a special channel for the investment of private funds in Commonwealth development. It normally expects to lend where ordinary sources are inappropriate or inadequate. Forty-five per cent. of its authorised share capital of £15m. (it is authorised to borrow up to twice its issued capital) is subscribed by the Bank of England, the remainder being subscribed by a number of industrial, commercial and banking concerns. Its importance for Africa has so far been relatively slight, though its commitments (at 31st March, 1958) included £2m. to the South African Electricity Supply Commission, £2m. to the South African Industrial Cellulose Corporation, and £3m. to the Federal Power Board in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

**(2) France**

The public recognition of metropolitan responsibility for the systematic promotion of colonial development has been in France, as in the United Kingdom, substantially a post-war phenomenon. It has, in fact, been carried further there than here, for responsibility has been accepted for covering practically the whole cost of colonial development. The promotion of development is entrusted to two main agencies.

**(a) Le Fonds d'Investissement pour le Développement Économique et Social des Territoires d'Outre-Mer (FIDES)**

FIDES (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) was established in 1946. Its operations fall into two categories: the General Section, which finances, on a straight grant basis, undertakings (e.g. scientific research, public development corporations, major public works studies) which benefit all territories or more than one territory; and the Overseas Section, which finances through grants or low-interest loans basic local equipment expenditures (e.g. roads, railways, harbours, airports, power, schools, hospitals, housing).

FIDES is financed essentially by the budget of metropolitan France—at present the Territories pay only a token contribution which, in practice, is paid with funds advanced to CCFOM (see below). The French Parliament appropriates the funds required by FIDES to carry out, year by year, the long-range plans which it has previously approved. The Executive Committee of FIDES apportions the funds according to the needs of each Territory on the basis of development programmes presented by the individual territories or groups of territories, after having been approved by the territorial assemblies. It is claimed that the local populations thus participate in planning at every stage: through their local elected representatives, through their deputies and senators in the French Parliament, and through members of the Executive Committee of FIDES.

FIDES supplies funds not merely to colonial

governments but also to state-controlled, mixed and private companies.

**(b) La Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer (CCFOM)**

This body has a variety of functions. In addition to managing the accounts of FIDES, it is responsible for issuing currency in the Overseas Territories and the control of foreign exchange operations. Apart from the funds which it advances to FIDES it has its own funds available for low-cost loans.

Total public investments in French African territories in the period 1947-58 may be shown as follows in U.S. dollars (revalued in francs of 1956 purchasing power converted at the 1956 rate of exchange):

FIDES General Section	Grants	\$305m.
" Overseas "	"	\$940m.
	Loans	\$445m.
CCFOM ("own funds")	Loans	\$450m.

Total appropriation by French Parliament, \$2,140m. This total appropriation was shared among the African territories in the following percentages: Fr. West Africa, 46; Fr. Equatorial Africa, 20; Cameroons, 17; Madagascar, 14; Togoland, 2; Fr. Somaliland, 1.

**(3) Belgium**

No institutions for the promotion of development in the Belgian Congo comparable to those existing in France and the U.K. have been set up in Belgium, the Congo's ten-year plan being financed mainly by loans specially floated for the purpose (a small part of the cost is covered by surpluses from the ordinary budgets of the Congo itself). Mention may, however, be made of the two following institutions:

**(a) Le Fonds du Bien-Etre Indigène (FBI)**

This fund, set up after the end of the second world war, consists of a capital sum of slightly over 2,000m. francs contributed by the Belgian Government, plus an annual subsidy derived from the proceeds of the colonial lottery. Most of its expenditure has been on health services and rural development.

**(b) L'Institut pour la Recherche Scientifique en Afrique Centrale (IRSAC)**

This institute was set up in 1947 with a capital grant of 200m. francs. It also receives annual subsidies from companies, and other corporate bodies. It is largely concerned with social research.

**Epilogue.**

'Africa owes its development to the modern world's increased demand for African minerals and tropical products . . . What Africa and other underdeveloped regions of the world need is not so much a patchwork of foreign aid programmes as a sustained demand and stabilisation of prices for their primary products.'<sup>3</sup> In October, 1956, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Hammarskjöld, said in his annual report: 'A change of only five per cent. in average export prices is approximately equivalent to the entire annual inflow of private and public capital and government grants to underdeveloped countries. The stabilisation of the prices of primary products should, I believe, have a high priority in the intensified programme for economic development.'

<sup>3</sup> *The United States and Africa, op. cit.*, pp. 114-5.



# Parliament and the Colonies

## STATE OF EMERGENCY IN NYASALAND

ON 27th February the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies made a statement in the House of Commons in which he said that the disturbances were contained. But the situation remained tense and against this background of violence and unrest H.M. Government had decided that the proposed constitutional talks could not at present be held. Lord Perth's visit had therefore been postponed.

Mr. James Callaghan asked whether there was any likelihood that the government would follow the panic-stricken measures adopted in Southern Rhodesia and why Lord Perth's visit had been postponed. Had the Opposition not yet impressed on the government the essential importance of getting on with these constitutional proposals, so that the people of Nyasaland knew where they stood. Would the government give their proposed plan for the future? When could they expect some result of those 18 months of negotiation? Mr. Amery replied that they had been advised by the Governor that to have gone ahead with the talks would have been to risk provoking further serious disturbances. The Governor had called for Federal reinforcements.

### Federal Government Pressure

On 3rd March Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the presence of reinforcements from other parts of the Federation had had the effect of preventing major disturbances in the previous few days, but there was such clear indication of the intention of the Congress to stir up further disturbances, involving widespread violence and murder of European, Asian and moderate African leaders, that the government had been compelled that morning to declare a state of emergency. Leading members of the Congress, including Dr. Banda, had been detained and removed to Southern Rhodesia. . . . When order had been restored H.M. Government would certainly resume with the Governor consideration of what constitutional reforms might be appropriate. Mr. Callaghan asked whether the Colonial Secretary had seen in *The Times* that morning that the Governor of Nyasaland had said at his press conference only the previous afternoon that 'no state of emergency was needed in Nyasaland to act against dissidents.' Was not this the most extraordinary state of emergency that had ever been declared? Was not the reality of the position that the Governor was not acting freely and that the Colonial Secretary had to support what was done, whether he agreed or not, because he was abdicating his responsibilities to the Central Government? Mr. Gaitskell asked why the Governor of Nyasaland had changed his mind within 24 hours between making a statement that, in his opinion, there was no need for a state of emergency to deal with dissidents, and a declaration of a state of emergency? Would the Colonial Secretary say whether during the previous few days any representations had been received from the Federal

Government urging H.M. Government to impose a state of emergency in Nyasaland? Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that the Governor certainly had not changed his mind. Up to the last moment he had hoped that the state of emergency could be avoided. Approaches had been made from the territorial government to the federal government for military help. Mr. Gaitskell asked again if any representations had been received from the Federal Government urging H.M. Government to impose a state of emergency. Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that it was not for him to give information as to what might pass between governments for which H.M. Government was not responsible. Mr. Paget asked whether Dr. Banda and his colleagues were not British-protected persons. Was it not a breach of their moral, treaty and constitutional obligations to move them out of protection into an area where the British government had no jurisdiction? Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that it would clearly have been impracticable in present circumstances to detain them in Nyasaland. Mr. Gaitskell asked why they were not moved to Northern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, or some other British colony. Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that was a matter in which local judgment must obviously play a large part.

In the adjournment debate later the same day Mr. Callaghan said that since the declaration of emergency, but not before, rioting had broken out, tear gas had been used and Africans killed. The Colonial Secretary could dust off all the phrases he had used about Cyprus and bring them out again. He would have plenty of occasions to use them during the succeeding few months. It was the duty of the Opposition to warn the House and the country before this situation reached the stage where truth could not be unravelled from lies. 1960, a date when the fate of the constitution was to be decided, was looming ever closer. What a tragedy the emergency was for a territory which had had a record for peaceful and harmonious development. What had happened to poison relations? Federation! Over the previous six years opposition to Federation had become more, not less intense in Nyasaland.

The Federal Government were endeavouring to create the position before 1960 in which, whoever was sitting on the government benches, it would be impossible for the House to exercise its responsibilities towards the Protectorates. Margery Perham had asked in *The Times* the week before, 'Is it sedition to want to remain a British colony?' He appealed to the government to make an early statement of their proposals for constitutional reform and to renew the definite pledges of 1953 that they would not hand over the people of Nyasaland to federal government until they wished to go.

Mrs. Eirene White referred to Dr. Banda's protest against the sending of S. Rhodesian troops into Nyasaland. That had been one of the major stupidities of the situation inevitably provoking violent reaction.



# Guide to Books . . .

## **The Birth of a Dilemma**

By Philip Mason (O.U.P., 30s.).

## **The Birth of a Plural Society**

By Dr. L. H. Gann (Manchester University Press, 25s.).

Mr. Mason, who is Director of the Institute of Race Relations, deals with the conquest and settlement of Rhodesia. Since the occupation of Northern Rhodesia was not accomplished by conquest, but almost entirely by agreement, the narrative deals largely with Southern Rhodesia. Except in an Epilogue the story is not brought beyond 1918 and concentrates on the earlier days.

Dr. Gann's work is designed as a record and source book for the development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company from 1894 to 1914, written for the Rhodes Livingstone Institute.

Everyone who tries to understand the poor effort of our civilisation in its dealings with East, Central and South Africa, has its own theory of why things went wrong. I found much in these two books to confirm my own theory that we should not have made so great a mess of things if we had never tried to settle on African land and usurp the name of African. I found a great deal in Philip Mason's account of settler treatment of African rights to confirm this belief. I hold that the man who goes to Africa to spend a working life as missionary, civil servant or in commerce, and then goes home, has a good chance of doing less harm to the African people. I found a great deal in Dr. Gann's account of relations between the Africans and the first missionaries and administrators to confirm this belief. I am content then to say in broad terms that both books are valuable guides to the early origins of the present position.

The pioneers did the best men can who feel that to seize land and develop it with cheap labour is justifiable even if it is necessarily accompanied by harshness. They were brave as other greedy men have been, but they were cruel. The story of the Mashona woman and her child killed after calculated discussion of her danger as a spy was new to me.

The Matabele had been brutal and that excused the pioneers. The Mashona had been treacherous and ungrateful for deliverance from the Matabele and they were dynamited in the holes and crevices among the rocks where they had hidden after they had rebelled.

Mr. Mason's chapter on the use of the jury system to prevent the adequate punishment of white men who had committed crimes against Africans will warn those who listen too long. Here was a good and honest British institution dishonoured and disgraced until the home government intervened and earned the 'lack of confidence' which the settlers often plaintively notice in themselves.

That one can find in this book the basis of many charges against the occupying settlers does not mean that Mason's book gives a one-sided account. It

is a carefully impartial book. It is not the recorder but the record that is damning.

Dr. Gann, whom Mr. Mason acknowledges to be one of his main sources, has considered settler motives more profoundly. His theory that the Portuguese Catholics were more ready to mix their blood and treat as one humanity their own race, the Africans and the product of miscegenation than were the British who came later (at a time when the theory of evolution from lower forms of life was imposing itself on Protestant theology) and that the Dutch feeling of superiority was confirmed by their Calvinism, seems to me a possible explanation of different patterns of inter-racial attitudes.

Both authors note that the settler stereotype of the African changes from the idle, lustful tribal exploiter of his wives who will not leave his village to work for the miner and the farmer and the missionary, to that of the degenerate, detribalised, urban rascal who competes with the European artisan and trader, or sells his produce and has no need to seek employment.

There are things that I cannot agree with in both books. Mason seems to me to divide matrilineal and patrilineal tribes too arbitrarily and not to see the effect of totemism on these concepts or the changes brought by inheritable property.

Gann says that Africans do not distinguish between different types of white men. I do not think this was ever true, though certainly they distinguish more as time passes. I remember with what anxiety the Barotse council inquired of me whether it was true that the King's daughter had married a Greek.

Out of both books comes very clearly that the European values the African as a worker only. The African needs an incentive to work and only in that light is he valued as a consumer. The checked and frustrated advance of Africans as trade unionists and co-operative producers stems from the Europeans' insistence on thinking of Africans as theirs to employ as profitably as possible and rarely as anything else. When the African learns this and moulds his method of achieving social and economic equality around the solid core of that fact, his object will be in sight.

*T. Fox-Pitt*

## **Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand**

By Max Gluckman (Rhodes-Livingstone Papers, No. 28. 8s. 6d.)

Those looking for an up-to-the-minute report on the social scene will perhaps be disappointed to find that this paper was published in the early 'forties as three articles and refers to Gluckman's researches in Zululand in the immediate pre-war years. But the reader wishing to understand what is happening in Africa and other parts of the world in more general terms than is given by the journalistic reportage of a sequence of events, or even the political commentator's particular analysis of a particular situation, will on the other hand draw com-



fort from the fact that these essays on social change should have been considered worth reprinting by the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

And worth reprinting they certainly are. Anthropologists in this country have often been accused of indifference to problems of changing societies, concentrating rather on developing their analysis of a social system at a particular point in time, preferring the homogeneous to the heterogeneous. There are a number of genuine reasons for their focus of interest, not the least important being that, despite the mass of literature on 'acculturation' and 'technical change' pouring from the presses of UNESCO and of American universities (in both cases there are again valid reasons for such a concentration of effort), little of broad theoretical interest has emerged. By this, I mean little that is not either on the commonsense level of observation or else specific to a certain situation.

Following in the theoretical tradition of Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown and the empirical example of Malinowski, Max Gluckman has made a valuable effort to construct hypotheses and concepts for the analysis of changing social systems. Those who have heard or read his Third Programme talks on 'Custom and Conflict in Africa' will be aware of some of the more general points concerning the function of conflict and of cross-cutting ties. But there is a great deal more of interest which could be further developed, tested and refined in a similar manner.

Gluckman begins with an account of a particular situation in Zululand involving both its black and white residents, the official opening of a newly-built bridge. Taking this situation, he shows how the major cleavage in the society between these two colour-groups operates in a specific context of a co-operative endeavour, how smaller groups differentiate and cut across the major cleavage, but are always influenced by it. Persons are members of these groups in different situations, a trades union in the town, a wide-ranging kin group back on the reserve, and it is this situational selection which enables a person to lead a relatively coherent life, despite the contradictory modes of behaviour involved. However, the contradictions of this temporary equilibrium may develop into overt conflicts and these conflicts result in structural change.

The second section consists of a brief analysis of the major alterations and adjustments in Zulu society over the last 120 years, arising out of rela-

tionships with groups of different cultures, black as well as white. This historical material is used to construct the social system at certain points of relative equilibrium in the past. By comparing these with the present position he is able to outline the changing function of various institutions and to relate these to the conflict situations. The final chapter is described as an 'experiment' in that it attempts to 'formulate abstractly processes of social change.' This most interesting attempt to lay down some 'invariable relations between events in a changing social system' is not always easy to read. Partly this is due to its very suggestiveness and partly to a somewhat over-compressed manner and the difficulties inherent in the manipulation of new concepts. The re-publication of these essays in this form will perhaps encourage Gluckman to expand his theoretical analysis and stimulate other social scientists to take up these suggestions for the study of similar situations, test and develop his propositions and thus build up our theoretical approach to that difficult and neglected subject, the comparative sociology of social change.

J. R. Goody

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